“Security is not a good in itself, without regard to the process by which it is achieved” Rothschild
The relationship between individuals and the state – so defined as Hobbes’ Leviathan – is one that centers on the provision of security. In the mutual transference of natural right from individuals to the state through contract, there emerges a condition of security otherwise absent in nature (Hobbes VII). While this principle of consent – best articulated in Rousseau’s Social Contract – is generally posited as the formative basis of state power, there appears less agreement as to the nature and extent of the security conferred by the state. Is it strictly the preservation of human life? Or does security entail a set of normative requirements based on a particular ontology of existence? Here, I affirm security as a social construction grounded in a subjective engagement with material conditions, and argue for a narrow definition – as proposed by David Roberts – in order to maintain intellectual coherence and allow a practical application of the concept to various contemporary challenges. Additionally, the proposed definition will help to further delineate the role of the state and limit transgressions upon individual liberties in the name of security.
Despite its fluidity as a concept, the idea of security has been a constant hallmark of liberal political thought and the principle focus of international relations. In exploring the conceptual origins of security, Emma Rothschild points to Cicero’s notion of an “absence of anxiety upon which the happy life depends” (Rothschild 61). Security in this sense is an inner and subjective experience of individuals, which later becomes an object of the liberal state - as chief enforcer. It is this idea of individual security that is transposed into the political and economically as the capitalist pre-condition of freedom from “the prospect of a sudden or violent attack on one’s person or property” (Rothschild 62).
In her analysis, Rothschild is particularly concerned with the relationship between the individual right to security and its enshrinement as a collective good though the instruments of state. She highlights the military period of the French Revolution as the moment in which the symbiotic relationship of individual and state shifted and security become an object of the state. If Paine’s Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1791 serves as a penultimate affirmation of the security of individuals, then in Rothschild’s view, the 1814 Congress of Vienna announced the dawn of a new era – one in which security was to be conceived as a relationship among states to “ensure the tranquility of the world” (Rothschild 65).
Mapping the contemporary landscape, one finds a broad range of minimalist and maximalist definitions of security grounded in particular world views and varying assumptions regarding the relationship between individuals and the state. From the state-centric realist framework which dominated the Cold War period, to the broader proclamations of the Copenhagen School, security remains a widely contested concept. In arguing against the static formulation of security as a state enterprise against external militant aggressor, counter-theorists have struggled to produce an alternative model which properly address the “material changes in the external environment” – to which the concept must apply (Sheenan 43).
While Barry Buzan’s People, States, and Fear is readily cited for expanding the concept with his five sector analysis, it is likewise criticized for not producing a cohesive and operative definition of the concept (Sheenan 56). In order to escape this moment of paralysis, I propose the adoption of David Roberts’ negative definition of security “to represent the avoidable civilian deaths, global in reach, which are caused by changeable human built social, political, economic, cultural or belief structures, created, inhabited and operated by other civilians whose work or conduct, indirectly and directly, unintentionally, unnecessarily and avoidably causes needless mortality around the globe” (Roberts 11).
In its wordiness, Roberts’ definition narrows the scope of security to avoidable death and yet broadens its practical reach to address the changeable socio-political, economic and cultural structures which directly and indirectly produce these deaths. The problem of over extension which dilutes the concept of its meaning and produces what Rothschild terms “a dizzying complexity of a political geometry…” is here avoided by establishing human agency service as the operative criteria (Rothschild 70). The value-laden assumptions associated with maximalist doctrines and the psychological incoherence they entail is curbed within this narrow definition of security, or rather insecurity, which assumes avoidable death as its organizing principle. By identifying the diverse and changeable human institutions which produce mortality across the globe, security action can be taken to effectively tackle these structural mechanisms operated “unintentionally, unnecessarily and avoidably” by other civilians (Roberts 11). While there remains much empirical work to be done and policy prescriptions to be made as to what constitutes, avoidable or unnecessary action, Roberts’ definition as he asserts, “marks a shift from the relative inertia of the recent debate” (Robert 11).
Roberts’ re-conceptualization more so than others answers Rothschild’s call for maximalists to narrow their inclusiveness, and conforms to her first principle of security – namely that they are held and have policy implications for officials. Robert’s definition bridge’s an academic appreciation of a world of interdependent fates and an international political regime stagnantly constituted along the framework of sovereign state interests. Reclaiming the liberal tradition of security as an individual subjective condition, he frames the idea as direct and indirect acts of civilians in any given part of the world which produce the avoidable death of others. The state is no longer the ultimate referent within the concept, but to be clear it remains its principal guarantor. We cannot in fact speak of a right to individual security without reference to the state, or as Rothschild declares it, “an objective of individuals that can only be achieved in some sort of collective enterprise” (Rothschild 63). The re-conceptualization by Roberts, in this sense, is a reconfiguration of the previously stated symbiotic relationship between the individual and state. He reaches back to the Congress of Vienna and re-negotiates peace and stability as the guarantee of individual security.
Roberts’ counter movement is not only a theoretical understanding of the un-intended consequences of a globalized world, but an appreciation of a political climate which is increasingly internationalist. Though the Kantian Cosmopolis remains only a promising ideal, the proliferation of intra and supra state structures of governance have proved a necessary outcome of the socio-economic realities of an increasingly integrated global body. The international community – loosely speaking – consists of an agglomeration of IGOs, NGOs, MNCs, and civil society. Modern innovations in transportation and information technology services have increased the capacity of individuals to form allegiances across national boundaries and make united claims through transnational movements. Despite glaring gaps in its enforcement capabilities, there exists a basic infrastructure on the global level that allows for a redress of individual security in the absence of state guarantees. The United Nations which was founder in strict statist terms to maintain security among nations has mushroomed and escaped its initial confines with institutions like the ICC and ICJ championing the security of individuals vis-à-vis the state.
Within this political context, Roberts’ deep and focused approach proves an important tool in framing questions of security and reaching appropriate solutions. In considering the 2003 genocide in Darfur which resulted in the direct and indirect loss of over 200,000 lives and displaced 2 million more, it is clear that the realist framework which presents security as an interest of the state proved inadequate (CFR.org). The government in Khartoum as tacit and overt supporters of the Janjaweed slaughter of civilians framed the crises as a matter of national security, while the international community at large weighed their national interests over the lives lost. Washington considered its counter-terrorism efforts with Khartoum, and France ironically launched raids to ensure the security of neighboring allies Chad and the Central African Republic. In formulating a response to the escalating conflict, the United Nations was hampered in prioritizing the sovereign right of Sudan (CFR.org). By contrast, a doctrine of international security
based on Robert’s definition, would have necessitated an immediate response to preserve the lives of all civilians – in immediate and indirect danger. The criterion of avoidable deaths is here crucial given both the initial grievances of the Justice and Equality Movement and the starvation policies pursued by Khartoum.
With the ongoing crises in Syria once more challenging archaic definitions of security, I assert an urgent need for to the re-conceptualization of security with the individual as referent. Roberts is correct in declaring that the “longer this debate meanders around methodological inexactitudes and definitional barriers, the longer humans globally will be insecure and vulnerable to violent global forces that, whilst not intending to administer harm, do so globally on a daily basis.” (Roberts 10). This is a moral indictment to which we must all answer. As I have argued, his negative definition of security as all direct and indirect human action which causes the avoidable death of civilians provides a best fit approach to the most urgent challenges of our contemporary world.
12/01/13
MM